Canada’s Action Plan in Response to the Nuclear Accident in Japan
Updated July 12, 2012
Greg Rzentkowski (white helmet), Director General of Nuclear Power Regulation at the CNSC, takes a first-hand look at the emergency portable pumps purchased by Ontario Power Generation for Darlington Nuclear Generation Station located near Bowmansville, Ontario (May 2012). The new emergency equipment, procured as part of the response to the accident in Japan, will further strengthen the operator’s emergency preparedness.
- Canada’s Overall Response to the Accident
- Timeline of Events and Actions Taken (March 11, 2011 – May 3, 2012)
Moving Forward
- Reinforcing Defences at Nuclear Power Plants
- Strengthening Emergency Preparedness at Nuclear Power Plants
- Taking Actions to Reinforce the Safety of Non-Power Reactor Facilities
- Improving Canada’s Nuclear Regulatory Framework
- Fostering Greater International Co-operation
- Enhancing Crisis Communication Capability
- FAQs and Useful Links
Canada’s Overall Response to the Accident
The CNSC activated the Emergency Operations Centre in Ottawa and staffed it 24/7 to monitor the situation in Japan, assess early reports and provide timely, accurate information.
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the coast of Japan. The earthquake and the resulting tsunami caused the loss of thousands of lives and half a million homes in Japan. It also caused an accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
The CNSC immediately activated its Emergency Operation Centre to monitor the situation and to provide advice to the Canadian government.
Shortly afterwards, the CNSC launched a review of all major nuclear facilities in Canada. The review, led by a multidisciplinary CNSC Task Force, confirmed the facilities’ ability to withstand and respond to credible external events, such as earthquakes.
Nonetheless, the CNSC established a four-year action plan to strengthen the defences at Canada’s nuclear power plants and further minimize risk. This action plan includes measures that improve emergency preparedness and the Canadian nuclear regulatory framework. The CNSC is also working to enhance its ability to communicate during an emergency.
Both the Task Force Report and the Action Plan were subject to several rounds of public consultation, as well as two independent evaluations, which confirmed that the CNSC response to the events in Fukushima was prompt, appropriate and comprehensive.
Internationally, CNSC staff have taken a leadership role among their peers. In addition to active participation in forums to share lessons learned, they have supported frank exchanges of information and greater transparency within the international nuclear community.
| Date | Events |
|---|---|
11 Mar 2011 |
A magnitude 9.0 earthquake near Japan generates an estimated 15-metre tsunami at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, leading to an accident at the plant. |
11 Mar 2011 |
The CNSC activates its Emergency Operations Centre. |
17 Mar 2011 |
The CNSC issues a directive to all major Canadian nuclear facilities requiring them to review initial lessons learned, re-examine their safety cases, and report on how they are addressing any gaps. |
22 Mar 2011 |
The CNSC issues a similar directive to all uranium mines and mines and other important nuclear facilities, such as facilities that host small research reactors. |
19 Apr 2011 |
The CNSC announces the creation of a multidisciplinary internal Task Force to evaluate the operational, technical and regulatory implications of TEPCO’s nuclear accident. |
7 July 2011 |
The CNSC issues the safety review criteria to clarify the scope of the Canadian “stress test” for nuclear power plants. |
28 Jul 2011 |
All nuclear power plant operators submit reports, based on these criteria, to the CNSC. The reports detail the operators’ findings and proposed plans in regard to their lessons learned from the accident in Japan, focusing on the reassessment of external hazards and beyond-design-basis accidents. OPG (PDF) Bruce Power (news release) New Brunswick Power (PDF) Hydro-Québec (not available) |
5 Aug 2011 |
CNSC President Micheal Binder forms the External Advisory Committee. |
28 Oct 2011 |
The CNSC issues the Task Force Report and Management Response for public consultation; it later integrates the comments received in the Action Plan. |
28 Nov 2011 |
The IAEA conducts a review of the CNSC’s response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear event and its implications for Canadian nuclear power plants. The CNSC is the first regulator to request such review. |
21 Dec 2011 |
The CNSC publishes a first draft version Action Plan on Task Force Recommendations for public consultation. |
02 Mar 2012 |
The CNSC integrates the comments received and publishes its second draft version of the Task Force Report, the Management Response and the Action Plan (PDF) for public consultation. |
05 Mar 2012 |
The IAEA publishes its report of the review conducted on Canada’s response. |
12 Apr 2012 |
The External Advisory Committee delivers its report to CNSC President Michael Binder. |
03 May 2012 |
The Commission Tribunal holds a public meeting to discuss the Task Force Report, the Management Response and the Action Plan (PDF). The recommendations from the External Advisory Committee, as well as input from the public, are integrated in the final CNSC Action Plan in light of the lessons learned from the accident in Japan. |
Action Plan implementation phases
The Action Plan is being implemented in three phases based on management direction and public consultation:
- Short term (12 months) – for all actions currently underway that can be accelerated – to be completed by December 2012
- Medium term (24 months) – for all measures requiring further analysis and engineering design, or regulatory development – to be completed by December 2013
- Long term (48 months) – for all actions initiated in the previous periods that will require station retrofits and/or prolonged outages – to be completed by December 2015
Moving Forward
Reinforcing Defences at Nuclear Power Plants
The CNSC Task Force confirmed that Canadian nuclear power plants are safe and have robust designs that rely on multiple layers of defence. Their designs ensure that there will be no impact on the public from credible accident scenarios, triggered by external events, such as tornadoes or earthquakes, or other causes such as system malfunctions.
The Canadian plant designs also offer strong protection against external events that are much less likely to happen. Nevertheless, to further reinforce defences, the CNSC Action Plan in response to the accident in Japan requires enhancements for managing the severe accidents that may be triggered by those very unusual events.
A CNSC site inspector examines a passive autocatalytic recombiner.
Examples of facility enhancements, some already underway, include:
- acquiring additional emergency mitigating portable equipment, such as power generators and pumps, which can be stored onsite and offsite and used to bring reactors to a safe shutdown state, in the unlikely event of a severe accident (short term)
- increasing capabilities to control hydrogen and other combustible gases (e.g., procurement of passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs) and monitoring equipment to be installed in reactor buildings and spent fuel pool areas; PARs can prevent hydrogen concentration from rising to combustible or explosive levels (medium term)
- improving containment so as to prevent unfiltered releases of radioactivity resulting from an accident not previously considered credible (e.g., installing emergency filtered containment venting) (long term)
The Action Plan also calls for additional studies, supported by state-of-the-art modelling tools, to analyze accident scenarios not previously considered credible, with special attention to multi-unit events, accidents triggered by extreme external events, and catastrophic spent fuel pool accidents.
Did you know? The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) commended the CNSC for its approach to integrating the lessons learned from TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in a prompt and comprehensive fashion.
Strengthening Emergency Preparedness at Nuclear Power Plants
In its review, the CNSC Task Force confirmed that emergency preparedness and response measures in Canada remain adequate. Nonetheless, improvements were identified to enhance emergency plans and capabilities to respond effectively in a severe event or multi-unit accident.
Onsite response
Bruce Power emergency services team poses for the camera. The CNSC requires nuclear power plant operators to have both a fire response team and a tactical team, in order to respond to different incidents that may occur onsite.
Nuclear power plant operators are being asked to conduct a comprehensive review of onsite emergency capabilities.
This includes assessments of arrangements in place for external support to be brought in onsite and of the primary and backup emergency response facilities, such as police forces. It also includes assessments of all emergency response equipment that requires electrical power to operate (e.g., electronic dosimeters, two-way radios).
Operators must also review their capability to provide offsite authorities with an estimate of the amount of radioactive material that may be released and the dose consequences. Actions to improve this capability include the installation of automated real-time radiation monitoring systems at station boundaries.
Offsite response
On March 28, 2012, New Brunswick Power Nuclear (NBPN), operator of the Point Lepreau Power Generating Station, conducted a large exercise. Above, NBPN’s Joe
McCulley, Senior Health Physicist at the provincial emergency operations centre, provides expertise in health physics during the exercise.
The CNSC is not directly involved in the offsite response to nuclear emergencies in Canada. The CNSC is nonetheless committed to facilitating discussions and engaging in exercises with the provincial and federal authorities in charge.
The CNSC Task Force recommended that regular and challenging exercises be conducted, and that the lessons learned from the exercises be discussed transparently.
It also called for an exhaustive review of measures in place, including public alerting systems, potassium iodide (KI) pill-stocking and distribution strategies, and the authorities’ capability for predicting offsite effects.
The CNSC will also be making changes to its regulatory framework and oversight measures to address concerns in this area. For instance, the CNSC will now require operators of all major facilities to submit their offsite emergency plans as part of the documentation required to renew their licence.
Taking Actions to Reinforce the Safety of Non-Power Reactor Facilities
Shortly after the accident in Japan, the CNSC also confirmed that non-power reactor facilities, such as uranium mines and nuclear fuel processing, waste and research facilities, were safe and adequately prepared to deal with potential, credible emergencies. Given the much lower of level of risk involved at those facilities, the CNSC Task Force focused its efforts on nuclear power plants.
Chalk River Laboratories' inner area
The one exception is the National Research Universal (NRU) reactor at Chalk River Laboratories near Ottawa, which is operated by AECL. Since the NRU reactor was in the process of re-licensing in 2011, the response from AECL on the lessons learned from the accident at Fukushima Daiichi was incorporated into the CNSC staff licence renewal reviews.
Since March 2011, the impact of the Fukushima Daiichi accident on other facilities has been discussed routinely with the Commission Tribunal as licences come up for renewal (e.g., Cameco’s Blind River and Port Hope facilities) and for updates to the Commission Tribunal (e.g., Cameco’s mines and mills). Where necessary, follow-up actions to lessons learned from the accidents have been included in licences and licence condition handbooks.
Going forward, CNSC staff will provide the Commission Tribunal and the public with yearly status updates in the performance report for uranium mines and nuclear fuel processing, waste and research facilities.
Improving Canada’s Nuclear Regulatory Framework
The Action Plan identified further improvements to be made to existing regulations and supporting regulatory documents. These improvements include proposed amendments to the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations and Radiation Protection Regulations to integrate new requirements for emergency situations.
In addition to the proposed changes to the regulations, the CNSC is also working on an “omnibus” project to amend documents on environmental protection, safety analysis and severe accident management. Revisions to documents that provide the CNSC's design requirements and site evaluation expectations are also being prepared. Finally, new documents are being developed for emergency preparedness and accident management.
The public will be consulted on all proposed changes to the regulatory framework through the CNSC's robust document development and consultation process.
Fostering Greater International Co-operation
In keeping with its international commitment, the CNSC will continue to play a strong role in encouraging member states of the IAEA to seek more frequent peer-reviews and to share the outcome of these missions with stakeholders.
These reviews are conducted through the IAEA’s Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) program and include follow-up assessments to verify the actions taken following the initial results.
The CNSC will also be meeting with CANDU senior regulators to seek a greater consensus on international actions. The meetings on the Convention on Nuclear Safety (the Convention), of which Canada was the first signatory, provide a unique forum for those exchanges to take place. The activities that surround the meetings of the Convention include comprehensive international peer reviews on specific regulatory topics, including on national responses to the accident in Japan.
As recommended by the External Advisory Committee, the CNSC will continue to work with other international regulators in convincing the members of the World Association of Nuclear Operators to share the results of their peer-review process, in order to promote nuclear safety in all nations with nuclear power plants.
The CNSC strongly believes that a greater level of transparency can be achieved at the international level, through careful and sensitive diplomatic undertakings to build consensus over time. The CNSC will continue to seek every opportunity to engage its peers in discussions that lead to greater nuclear safety worldwide.
Enhancing Crisis Communication Capability
The CNSC’s Sunni Locatelli (second from left), Director General of the Strategic Communications Directorate, delivered a presentation at the OECD/NEA Workshop
on Crisis Communication in Madrid, Spain (May 9–10, 2012).
While the CNSC was recognized for its public communications to Canadians following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the CNSC is developing a comprehensive communication and education strategy to enhance the organization’s ability to respond in the unlikely event of a nuclear accident in Canada.
This includes the use of social media and expanding partnerships and relationships with various science media organizations that have the ability to inform the public on nuclear safety.
Several steps have already been taken towards improving communication and coordination with stakeholders and organizations involved in disseminating information related to nuclear safety. These steps include:
- launching social media tools; Facebook is already live and the CNSC Youtube channel will be launched by fall 2012
- enhancing the CNSC Web site to include new content in plain language to better cover all safety-significant aspects of the operation of nuclear facilities and measures in place to deal with nuclear emergencies
- developing new educational initiatives such as an online and printed package of educational resources and a Web-based interactive tool created to explain the nuclear fuel lifecycle
- Increasing the CNSC’s international co-operation and participation in international forums to exchange best practices and lessons learned from the Fukushima crisis.
Frequently Asked Questions and Useful Links
- Fukushima health reports
- Seismic activity near major Canadian nuclear facilities
- INES Classification and what it means
- What advice do we have for Canadians in Japan?
- Is there a health risk to Canadians from radiation from Japan?
- What is Health Canada doing to monitor the health risks (effects) of the radiation leak in Japan?
- What is Canada doing to ensure that imported food is safe?
Presentations
- Presentation by Sunni Locatelli, Director General, Strategic Communications, at the OECD/NEA Workshop on Crisis Communication (PDF) May 10, 2012
- Presentation by Dr. Greg Rzentkowski, Director General of Power Reactor Regulations, at a public Commission Tribunal meeting (PDF) May 3, 2012
- Presentation by Executive Vice President Ramzi Jammal to External Advisory Committee (PDF) August 5, 2011
- Presentation by Ramzi Jammal, Executive Vice-President and Chief Regulatory Operations Officer, at the 2011 IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety (PDF) June 22, 2011
- Intervention delivered by the Head of the Canadian delegation, Karen Ellis, Associate Deputy Minister at Natural Resources Canada, at the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety (PDF) June 20, 2011
- CNSC and Natural Resources Canada presentations to Commission Tribunal regarding the earthquake in Japan March 30, 2011