

GREENPEACE

May 20, 2014

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
P.O. Box 1046, Station B
280 Slater Street
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada
K1P 5S9
Via email: consultation@cnsccsn.gc.ca

Re : Comments on Emergency Planning RegDoc-2.10.1

To whom it may concern,

The CNSC has requested comment from the public on its intention to add three requirements to RegDoc-2.10.1, *Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response*, that were not included in the draft regulatory guide during the public consultation in the Fall of 2013.

The following outlines Greenpeace's perspective on these changes. While Commission staff have not provided exact wording related to these changes, Greenpeace will suggest some modifications.

Greenpeace is supportive of the proposed additional regulatory requirements. The CNSC proposes to add the three following requirements to RegDoc-2.10.1:

- “the pre-distribution of iodine thyroid blocking agents to all residences, businesses and institutions within the plume exposure planning zone (sometimes named the primary zone or the urgent protective action zone, typically sized at approximately 10 km), and selective pre-distribution in the ingestion planning zone (sometimes named secondary zone or extended planning distance, typically sized at approximately 50 to 80 km)”;
- “the content of emergency information materials and the distribution of such materials in the plume exposure planning zone, as well as ensuring that emergency plan information is available online to all residents within the ingestion planning zone”;
- “The provision of the CNSC and offsite authorities with the technical planning basis for the station's emergency preparedness and response program.”

As mentioned, Greenpeace believes these are sensible additions, but also feels additional detailed instructions are required for them to be meaningful.

At a high-level, Greenpeace suggests that these additional emergency planning requirements **should be designed to fight complacency**. Greenpeace has observed a significant amount of complacency among provincial, municipal and federal agencies responsible emergency planning in spite of the Fukushima disaster.

It has been documented that corporations and government agencies often depend on emergency plans to maintain a delusion that they are adequately prepared for such disasters. Reliance on such “fantasy documents” – including Ontario’s current offsite nuclear emergency plans – may actually increase risks to public safety because they provide a false sense of security.¹

Greenpeace feels that Canadian authorities, such as the CNSC, EMO and OPG, are currently relying on such “fantasy documents” and giving Canadians a false sense of security. This increases threats to the public.

Greenpeace recommends CNSC staff revise RegDoc-2.10.1 with an eye to deterring Canadian authorities from becoming complacent, giving a false sense of security and relying on such “fantasy documents.” Greenpeace believes this could partially be done by modifying the three aforementioned requirements to:

- Establish an ongoing dialogue with affected populations regarding nuclear emergency plans;
- Require regular public reporting on the public attitudes and understanding of nuclear emergency plans;
- Require regular (preferably annual) reporting on the success of pre-distributing iodine thyroid blocking agents;
- Establish mechanisms to regularly challenge the provincial planning basis for offsite nuclear plans, in light of such things as population growth and technological changes (particularly communication technology);
- Regularly test the adequacy of offsite nuclear emergency plans through the development and publication of modelling of large accidental radiation releases and anticipated emergency response.

The aforementioned measures would help ensure an ongoing transparent dialogue between the public and government authorities (both provincial and federal) based on continually updated evidence. At present there is no such dialogue, no reporting requirements, or evidence gathering mechanisms. This has allowed government authorities, including the CNSC, to fall into complacency.

Indeed, the additional requirements proposed by the Commission only came about because of heightened public concern following the Fukushima disaster. Greenpeace urges the Commission to ensure that the next rigorous review of offsite emergency plans doesn’t wait for the next nuclear disaster. It should be a regular ongoing public discussion.

The Pre-distribution of Iodine

CNSC staff have proposed to add the following require to RegDoc-2.10.1:

- “the pre-distribution of iodine thyroid blocking agents to all residences, businesses and institutions within the plume exposure planning zone (sometimes named the primary zone or the urgent protective action zone, typically sized at approximately 10 km), and selective pre-distribution in the ingestion planning zone (sometimes named secondary zone or extended planning distance, typically sized at approximately 50 to 80 km)”;

¹ Lee Clarke, *Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster*, University of Chicago Press, 1999.

Greenpeace supports the addition of this requirement, but would like to highlight that by adding this requirement the CNSC and Ontario are just playing catch-up with international practices.

The Fukushima Task Force noted in 2011 that Ontario is the only nuclear province in Canada that does not already pre-distribute KI to residents in the surrounding planning zones.² The pre-distribution of iodine is already common place in Europe within the Emergency Planning Zone.³ Moreover, Switzerland passed a new regulation this year requiring iodine to be pre-distributed to everyone within 50 km of a Swiss reactor.⁴

So while commendable, the CNSC's proposal to pre-distribute iodine to residences within 10 km of Canadian nuclear stations is long overdue **but does not meet international best practices.**

Greenpeace would also note that there is no discernable scientific or evidence base for the current 10 km Primary Zone. It is an artefact of decisions made by Ontario in 1980s and is arbitrary. Its use to limit the pre-distribution of iodine pills would also be arbitrary.

In this light, Greenpeace believes the CNSC and EMO have an obligation to consult affected communities outside of the 10 km zone before foreclosing on the pre-distribution of iodine beyond the 10 km primary zone.

Greenpeace makes the following recommendations related to this requirement:

- RegDoc-2.10.1 should state that polluter-pays principle will apply to the pre-distribution of iodine. Even if not responsible for the pre-distribution and public communications, licensees should cover the costs.
- RegDoc-2.10.1 should state that the pre-distribution of iodine to residents within the 10km primary zone is a minimum, pending public consultations with surrounding communities.
- RegDoc-2.10.1 should require annual public reporting on the success of iodine pre-distribution. Such public reports should identify barriers to pre-distribution as well as recommendations and plans for improving pre-distribution.

Publication of the planning basis of provincial emergency plans

CNSC staff have proposed to add the following require to RegDoc-2.10.1:

- "The provision of the CNSC and offsite authorities with the technical planning basis for the station's emergency preparedness and response program."

Greenpeace supports the addition of this requirement.

Greenpeace has had significant problems acquiring information from Emergency Management Ontario on the assumptions and details of its offsite nuclear emergency plans. At the Pickering relicensing

² CNSC, *Fukushima Task Force Report*, INFO-0824, October 2011, p. 47.

³ ENCO, *Review of Current Off-Site Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response Arrangements in EU Members States and Neighboring Countries*, Prepared for the European Commission, December 2013, p. 30.

⁴ See: <http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/20131043/index.html>

hearings in May 2013, EMO staff stated that the public must resort to provincial Freedom of Information (FOI) requests to acquire such information.

EMI has been unresponsive to these requests. Greenpeace currently has approximately 20 FOI requests pending with EMO. These requests are nine to eighteen months overdue with no timelines for a final response. Greenpeace has, however, received timely response to similar information requests filed with the CNSC.

In this light, Greenpeace encourages the CNSC to require EMO to proactively publish information related to offsite nuclear emergency plans, including the technical planning basis for the station's emergency preparedness and response program.

Conclusion

Thank you for this opportunity to comment on RegDoc-2.10.1, *Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response*.

Please don't hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or require any clarifications.

Truly,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Shawn-Patrick Stensil". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, circular flourish at the end.

Shawn-Patrick Stensil
Nuclear Analyst, Greenpeace